9-1-1 DDoS: Threat, Analysis and Mitigation by Guri, Mordechai et al.
9-1-1 DDoS: Threat, Analysis and Mitigation 
  
Abstract - The 911 emergency service belongs to one of the 16 
critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. Distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks launched from a mobile phone 
botnet pose a significant threat to the availability of this vital 
service. 
In this paper we show how attackers can exploit the cellular 
network protocols in order to launch an anonymized DDoS 
attack on 911. The current FCC regulations require that all 
emergency calls be immediately routed regardless of the 
caller’s identifiers (e.g., IMSI and IMEI). A rootkit placed 
within the baseband firmware of a mobile phone can mask and 
randomize all cellular identifiers, causing the device to have no 
genuine identification within the cellular network. Such 
anonymized phones can issue repeated emergency calls that 
cannot be blocked by the network or the emergency call 
centers, technically or legally. We explore the 911 
infrastructure and discuss why it is susceptible to this kind of 
attack. We then implement different forms of the attack and 
test our implementation on a small cellular network. Finally, 
we simulate and analyze anonymous attacks on a model of 
current 911 infrastructure in order to measure the severity of 
their impact. We found that with less than 6K bots (or $100K 
hardware), attackers can block emergency services in an entire 
state (e.g., North Carolina) for days. We believe that this paper 
will assist the respective organizations, lawmakers, and 
security professionals in understanding the scope of this issue 
in order to prevent possible 911-DDoS attacks in the future. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The '911' emergency number was instituted in the US in 
1968 in response to the need for a universal and effective 
method of reporting emergencies. Over the years the system 
has evolved, and in 1999 the US government enacted the 
Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act. This 
federal law mandated the use of 911 as a universal 
emergency number and “enhanced 911” (E911) as the base 
technology for handling calls from wireline and wireless 
phones. The E911 network provides dedicated infrastructure 
for routing and connecting 911 calls to the nearest public call 
center. These call centers are referred to as public safety 
answering points (PSAP). 
Today, 911 services are a part of the United States' 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors [1]. Its availability is vital to the 
population of the United States.  
1.1 DDoS Attacks on 911 
A DDoS attack launched from a mobile phone botnet is a 
significant threat to the availability of 911 services. In this 
attack, frequent fraudulent calls are made to 911 by a botnet 
comprised of many mobile phones. Many PSAPs work at 
full capacity [2] and cannot handle this large volume of calls. 
Moreover, this call volume can disrupt the telephony 
network itself, preventing legitimate 911 calls from ever 
reaching a PSAP. This was evident during the 9/11 terror 
attack which, in effect, caused the population to generate a 
DDoS attack on New York City’s telephony network by 
collectively dialing 911 [3].  
In 2015 over 90% of American adults owned a cell phone, and 
64% of the devices were smartphones [4]. An attacker that 
recruits even a fraction of these devices to a botnet would give 
this attacker has the potential to deny 911 services to an entire 
state, or possibly the entire country.  
This attack currently affects both the service and the client 
in the following ways: 1) Generally, PSAPs have no built-in 
way of blacklisting callers. Therefore, in the face of a large 
attack, they would have no choice but to answer each and 
every call. 2) Even with a blacklisting system in place, the 
owner of an infected device would be blocked from 
legitimately receiving emergency services, even in a time of 
need.  
1.2 An Anonymized DDoS Attack on 911  
In 1996 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
issued the E911 First Report and Order which required 
wireless providers to forward 911 calls to a PSAP regardless 
of caller validation: 
"The basic 911 rules require wireless carriers to transmit all 
911 calls to a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) without 
regard to validation procedures intended to identify and 
intercept calls from non-subscribers. Under the rules, 
therefore, both subscribers and non-subscribers can dial 
911 and reach emergency assistance providers without 
having to prove their subscription status." 
~FCC WIRELESS 911 REQUIREMENTS [5] 
A DDoS attack launched from a mobile phone botnet can 
exploit this ruling in order to make its attack more difficult 
to mitigate. If a bot randomizes the device’s cellular 
identifiers, it becomes impossible to blacklist its 911 calls.  
In this paper we expose and analyze this new threat by 
proving its feasibility and by measuring its potential impact 
via simulations. We found that only 6,000 infected devices 
are enough to severely harm the availability of the 911 
services of a US state. We also found that some device-level 
and network-level countermeasures can help in mitigating 
this threat. 
1.3 Contributions 
The following are the contributions of this paper: 
 We identify a new threat to the availability of emergency 
services: an anonymous, unblockable 911-DDoS attack from 
mobile phones. We present how this attack is perpetrated and 
discuss the bots involved.  
 We implement bots that can carry out this attack, and test them 
on a small cellular network in order to demonstrate the attack’s 
feasibility. By describing the behavior and implementation of 
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these samples, we provide the tools and knowledge to prevent 
potential attacks in the future. 
 We gauge the severity of the attack and analyze the 
weaknesses of the E911 networks by simulating the attack on 
a reconstruction of actual E911 infrastructure. The simulations 
are based on real call volume statistics, network topologies, 
and configurations which we have collected from various 
published surveys, reports, statistics, and documentation. We 
analyze possible weaknesses of the current E911 network and 
measure the number of bots required to accomplish an attack. 
We believe that this paper will assist the respective 
organizations, lawmakers, and security professionals in 
understanding the scope of this issue. It is our intent that the 
analysis, simulations, and models will provide these 
stakeholders with a means of detecting and preventing 
possible attacks in the future.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In 
section 2 we review related work. In section 3 we provide a 
technical overview of the cellular network and E911 
infrastructure as relevant to this paper. In section 4 we 
introduce the adversarial attack model and the bot types. In 
section 5 we present the design and implementation. In 
section 6 we provide an in depth analysis of the attacks at the 
state and country level. In section 7 we present 
countermeasures, and we conclude in section 8. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
Denial of Service (DoS). A DoS attack is an attack that targets 
the availability of a service. DDoS attacks are DoS attacks 
which are usually launched from a group of devices (botnet), 
each of which is infected with a malicious agent (bot). A wide 
range of studies have been published on this subject, 
demonstrating different types of DDoS attacks [6] and related 
detection [7] and defense [8] techniques. A Telephony Denial 
of Service (TDoS) attack is a special type of DoS attack that 
targets the telephone line’s availability. However, TDoS 
attacks have been mainly studied within the context of VoIP 
telephone systems [9]. Throughout this paper we will refer to 
Telephony DDoS with the more common term DDoS. DDoS 
attacks are considered one of the major threats and most 
challenging problems of today’s cyber-security world [10] 
Mobile Phone Botnets. With the rise of smartphone popularity, 
botnet authors have been increasing their efforts on mobile 
devices [11]. A detailed survey on the timeline of mobile 
botnets and their characteristics is provided by Nigam [12]. In 
2010, Mulliner and Seifert presented a cellular botnet 
architecture and evaluated it with several practical 
implementations [13]. In 2011 Taining el al presented 
"Andbot," a stealthy, resilient, and low-cost botnet designed for 
smartphones [14]. Mobile botnets have also been used to dial 
premium numbers send premium SMSs, or conduct spam 
campaigns. A thematic taxonomy on smartphone botnet attacks 
is given in [15]. 
In September 2015, 650,000 Chinese smartphones launched 
a DDoS attack against websites by collectively issuing over 
275,000 HTTP requests per second [16]. This event 
demonstrated the threat of DDoS attacks launched from 
mobile phone botnets. Traynor et al demonstrated how a 
mobile botnet composed of ~11K compromised mobile 
phones could be used in a DDoS attack targeting the core of 
a cellular network, an attack which could degrade cellular 
service by 93% on a regional scale [17].  
911-DDoS. DoS attacks on emergency call centers have 
been publicly mentioned in [18] [19]. In 2013, the US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued an alert stating that 
various public services may be vulnerable to DDoS attacks 
[20]. This warning was triggered due to a DoS attack 
launched against the administrative line of a PSAP (not the 
911 emergency line). In 2014, Dameff et al presented 
"Hacking 911" at DEF CON and provided a general 
description of attack vectors on 911 services [21]. The 
authors broadly discussed line-cutting, cell phone jamming, 
and DDoS attacks. [21] does not review the 911-DDoS 
attack in depth and lacks discussion on the implementation, 
analysis, and mitigation of this threat. 
Table 1 compares existing methods of DDoS attacks on 911. 
As can be seen, attacks launched from landlines, mobile 
phones, and pre-paid mobile phones expose the phone 
number, SIM identifier (IMSI), and device-identifier (IMEI) 
to the cellular network. The bot types presented in this paper 
can mask these identifiers during the attack, hence making 
them resilient to blacklisting and blocking.  
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no academic 
research on the threat of anonymous 911-DDoS attacks 
launched from a mobile phone botnet.  
3. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
In this section we provide background information on the 
cellular and E911 networks, as relevant to this paper. 
3.1 Cellular Network 
2G, 3G, and 4G are three generations of mobile networks 
(referred to as GSM, UMTS, and LTE respectively), based 
on different standards, network architecture, and protocols. 
Throughout this paper, we will refer to the elements and 
specifications common to all three generations in common 
terms.  
IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity). The IMSI 
is a unique identification number across all cellular networks 
which is used to identify a mobile subscriber. This number 
is stored in the SIM card as a 15 digit number. For privacy 
reasons a randomly generated TMSI (Temporary Mobile 
Subscriber Identity) is often used instead of the actual IMSI 
Table 1. Comparisons of DDoS attacks on 911.  
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for authentication, location updates, paging, call requests, 
and other activities. 
IMEI (International Mobile Station Equipment Identity). The 
IMEI is a 15 digit number for identifying mobile equipment 
(e.g., mobile phones and cellular modems) in cellular 
networks [22]. The IMEI is either stored in the device’s 
firmware or burned into its ROM. The cellular network can 
request the IMEI of a device during the authentication phase, 
in order to check it against the Central Equipment Identity 
Register (CEIR) which blacklists stolen devices.  
NSI (Non-Service Initialized). A mobile phone registers and 
unregisters with the network using the IMSI attach and IMSI 
detach procedures [23]. When a mobile phone is unable to 
register to the network, the network considers the device NSI 
and does not provide the device with data or call services. A 
device may be NSI when 1) no SIM card is inserted (no-
SIM), 2) the subscription associated with the SIM is inactive, 
3) the subscriber has not paid his/her bills, 4) the IMSI or 
roaming subscriber is unknown, or 5) the IMEI has been 
blacklisted (e.g., a stolen device).  
Emergency Calls. When a user dials an emergency number, a 
CM_SERVICE_REQUEST with a parameter indicating the 
establishment of an emergency call, is sent to the network [23]. 
In LTE, a special emergency attach procedure is required before 
issuing emergency calls. Emergency calls can be made from 
any device-network registration state, even the NSI. This is 
because FCC regulations required all cellular operators to route 
all emergency calls to their destination, regardless of the mobile 
phone’s available identifiers [5]. Currently, a device must 
provide at least provide an IMEI in order to receive emergency 
services [24].  
Table 2 summarizes the different states of device registration 
and the identifiers exposed to the network in each case. As 
can be seen, even in the NSI modes, the IMSI or IMEI (or 
both) are sent to the network. 
3.2 E911 Network 
According to the National Emergency Number Association 
(NENA), at least 99% of the population of the US have 
access to E911 [25]. Therefore, for the duration of this paper 
we only consider the E911 infrastructure of the US. In 
general, when someone dials 9-1-1 the telecom provider 
connects the call to the E911 network. The E911 network is 
responsible for routing 911 calls to the PSAP nearest the 
caller, as well as providing useful information about the 
caller (e.g., name and location) to the PSAP’s receiving call 
taker. Fig. 1 presents an illustration of an E911 network and 
its elements. The edges in the network are groupings of 
trunks (single voice lines). 
Public-Safety Answering Point (PSAP). PSAPs are call 
centers which receive 911 calls originating from within their 
service area.  There are two kinds of PSAPs: primary and 
secondary. Primary PSAPs are the PSAPs that first receive 
the 911 call. In some cases, a primary PSAP may transfer a 
911 call to a secondary PSAP when deemed necessary. An 
example of a secondary PSAP is a poison control hotline.  
Selective Router (SR). There are special dedicated 
telephony switches called selective routers which are located 
between the public telephone networks and the PSAPs. The 
SRs are responsible for connecting 911 calls from the 
telephone network to the primary PSAP closest 
(geographically) to the caller. SRs are owned by the local 
emergency service organization but are located and managed 
by a local telecom company. 
Telephone Switch (TS). When a call is made from a 
landline phone, it travels over the public switched telephone 
network (PSTN) to a local switching station sometimes 
referred to as the central office (CO). COs are either 
connected to a SR, or in rare cases, are connected directly to 
a PSAP. When a call is made by a mobile phone, its signal 
is received by a nearby cell tower whose physical link is 
managed by a base station controller (BSC). The BSC 
connects the call to a mobile switching center (MSC or S-
GW in 4G) for call management and call switching. Like a 
CO, a MSC is connected to a SR. 
Caller Identification and Location Information. Caller 
identifiers are provided to the PSAP by the PSTNs and 
cellular networks. These identifiers are used to retrieve 
relevant information about the caller from a shared database, 
called an automatic location information (ALI), between the 
E911 network and the other networks. For wireless callers, 
if the device is not registered on the cellular network (i.e., 
NSI), the call-back number displays zeros or the mobile’s 
IMEI.  
Call Routing. Call routing in the E911 network works as 
follows. First, when a TS receives a 911 call, the call is 
connected with its local SR. If all of the trunks between a TS 
Figure 1. An illustration of an E911 network topology. 
Table 2. Different states of device registration in the cellular 
network, along with the exposed identifiers.  
State NSI During registration During emergency calls 
Registered  IMSI,IMEI IMSI and IMEI 
No-SIM X - IMEI 
Non-payed / 
expired X IMSI IMSI 
Unknown IMSI X IMSI (unknown) IMSI and IMEI 
Blocked IMEI X IMSI, IMEI IMEI 
 
and a SR are in use, a traffic overflow occurs. In this case, 
the TS may have an additional SR configured to receive the 
extra traffic; otherwise the call is dropped. When a SR 
receives a 911 call from a TS, it attempts to connect the call 
to the primary PSAP which is closest to the caller’s location. 
To determine the PSAP, the SR has a routing table called a 
Selective Router Database (SRDB) which links each caller’s 
identifier with a PSAP [26]. The SR then connects the call 
to the target PSAP. If a traffic overflow occurs between the 
SR and PSAP, then either: 1) the caller is automatically 
transferred to an alternate predesignated PSAP (overflow 
routing), or 2) the caller receives a busy signal and is 
disconnected. If there is an available trunk but no available 
call taker, the call is connected, but the caller may hear a call 
progress-tone until the call is answered.  
Both wireline and wireless calls are routed over the same 
SR-PSAP trunks with no distinction. However, some SR-
PSAP links have dedicated trunks for wireline or wireless 
calls [27]. The reason for doing this is to ensure that, for 
example, a rush of wireless calls do not totally block out 
wireline calls. During a call, a PSAP may transfer the call to 
a different PSAP. If the other PSAP is connected to a 
different SR, a tandem connection may be used if available.  
4. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK MODEL 
The adversarial attack model (Fig. 2) is as follows: The 
attacker builds a botnet of mobile phones by infecting devices 
with malware (Fig. 2, step 1). At the appropriate time, the 
attacker signals the botnet to continuously call 911 (Fig. 2, 
step 2a). This command is signaled via the attacker’s 
command and control server (C&C) located somewhere on 
the Internet or by sending covert SMSs to the bots. The 
attacker can infect the mobiles by using common mobile 
infection vectors: app markets, email attachments, 
compromised websites and malvertising campaigns, and 
malicious SMS/MMS [28]. Supply chain attacks, where 
devices were found to be pre-installed with malicious code, 
have been found in the wild [29]. 
There two kinds of anonymous bots: anonymous (ܣ), and 
persistent anonymous (ܣ∗). We refer to the type of bot that 
is not anonymous as (ܰܣ). These bots differ in the identifiers 
they provide to the cellular network when making a 911 call 
(Fig. 2, step 2b). Anonymous bots cannot easily be identified 
and blocked by the network. These bots strengthen the 
impact of the DDoS attack, since they exist longer in the 
botnet. We will now describe each of these types of bots and 
their implications. 
Non-Anonymized (ࡺ࡭). ܰܣ is a type of bot which makes 911 
calls from the device’s main OS (e.g., Android and iOS). When 
doing so, the identifiers (IMSI/IMEI) are exposed to the cellular 
network as in any non-emergency call. The subscriber 
information reaches the PSAP where it can then be used to assist 
in blocking the DDoS device. 
Anonymized (࡭).  ܣ is a type of bot which hides its subscriber 
information (IMSI) from the network in order to make 911 
calls, and is implemented within the firmware of the device’s 
baseband processor. These bots accomplish this by virtually 
entering No-SIM state, a state where only the IMEI is exposed 
to the network [24]. In some cases an IMEI can be traced back 
to the owner, but it is a long and difficult process. In addition, 
locating and collecting ܣ type bots from the field is more 
difficult than for ܰܣ type bots because the location-detection 
of NSI devices can be inaccurate [30].  
Persistent Anonymized (࡭∗). ܣ∗ is a type bot that 
randomizes the identifier (IMSI or IMEI) provided to the 
cellular network, and is implemented within the firmware of 
the device’s baseband processor. ܣ∗ cannot be blocked by 
use of a blacklist implemented in the cellular network, E911 
network, or at the PSAP. This is because the bot changes the 
identifier before every call. We provide two variations of 
(࡭∗) implementation, using masking and spoofing 
techniques. 
All types of bots (ܰܣ, ܣ, and ܣ∗) are capable of injecting 
audio (such as synthesized/recorded voice) into the 911 call. 
Doing so can be done to incur extra delays in the 911 call 
taker’s process of determining whether the caller is a bot or 
not.  
5. ANATOMY OF A 911-DDOS BOT 
In order to demonstrate the feasibility a 911-DDoS attack 
launched from anonymized mobile botnet, we designed, 
implemented and tested versions of the ܣ∗ bot on a small 
cellular network. For comparison purposes, we also 
implement ܣ and ܰܣ type bots.  
5.1 Implementation of an ࡺ࡭ Bot 
Non-anonymized DDoS attacks on 911 can be launched 
from the main OS without interfering with the baseband 
firmware. Although this is not the main contribution of the 
paper, we now briefly present the implementation of such a 
bot for comparison purposes.  
 
Figure 2. The adversarial attack model and an illustration of the bot’s identifiers carried over the cellular and E911 networks. 
For our tests, we implemented a ܰܣ type bot on the Android 
OS. In the following subsections we briefly describe the 
Android Radio Interface Layer (RIL), the bot’s RIL 
interception proxy, and the implementation for injecting 
audio into emergency calls.  
5.1.1 Radio Interface Layer (RIL) 
In Android, the Radio Interface Layer (RIL) is the interface 
between the high level telephony services and the baseband 
hardware (cellular modem). The RIL defines two types of 
operations: 1) solicited commands (such as calling requests 
and the sending SMS messages) are sent from the telephony 
services to the baseband, and 2) unsolicited commands (such 
as incoming calls and network notifications) are sent from 
the baseband to the telephony services. Each vendor supplies 
its own implementation for the RIL interface. A vendor’s 
RIL is closed source and shipped with the stock Android 
firmware as shared object binary files. The RIL Daemon 
(RILD) serves as the interface between the Android 
telephony services and the vendor’s RIL via a 
communication socket. 
5.1.2 The RIL Interception Proxy 
To demonstrate a ܰܣ type bot’s covert abilities, we 
implemented an interception proxy mediating between the 
RILD and the vendor’s RIL. This component is capable of 
intercepting and manipulating any solicited or unsolicited 
command exchanged between the Android framework and 
the baseband.  
5.1.3 Making a Covert Emergency Call 
The following are the primary commands which are handled 
by the RIL interception proxy to perform its DoS activities 
under stealth. The specific commands may differ between 
manufacturers. When the user makes/receives a call, the bot 
immediately halts its activities. With REQUEST_DIAL 
command the bot initiates an emergency call at its 
interception proxy towards the vendor’s RIL. After initiating 
the emergency call, the proxy intercepts the response as it 
comes up from the baseband. The Android framework is not 
aware that the call has been made or received, because the 
commands did not pass through the standard framework’s 
APIs.  The CALL_STATE_CHANGED command is sent 
from the baseband to the Android telephony services 
whenever the emergency call state changes (e.g., when an 
emergency call is answered). The RIL intercepts this 
command to hide the bot’s activity. The 
RIL_REQUEST_GET_CURRENT_CALLS command is 
used to get the list of current calls and their status. When the 
Android telephony service invokes this command it notifies 
the respective elements (e.g., the GUI) and updates the 
logs/call history. The bot’s proxy intercepts this list, omits 
the emergency call, and forwards the list up to the RILD.  
5.1.4 Audio Injection 
By default, the injection of audio into an ongoing call 
(uplink) is not supported by the Android API. On some 
platforms (e.g., Qualcomm's MSM8960 chipset) it is 
possible to inject recorded audio, utilizing support from the 
Advanced Linux Sound Architecture (ASLA) via the 
Incall_Music Audio Mixer. Using the technique described in 
[31], we were able to successfully inject a WAV audio 
recording into an ongoing call using a Samsung Galaxy S4 
Mini smartphone. 
5.2 Implementations of ࡭ and ࡭∗ Bots 
Modern mobile phones have a cellular protocol stack 
managed by a separate real-time operating system (RTOS) 
which runs on the baseband processor. The main OS (e.g., 
Android) and the baseband RTOS work independently of 
one another and exchange data through shared memory or 
similar mechanisms. 
In order to make anonymous 911 calls, ܣ type bots need to 
switch the protocol stack into no-SIM state, and ܣ∗ bots need 
to be able to spoof the phone’s identifiers. These 
manipulations require low-level access to the phone’s 
cellular protocol stack and internal state machine. 
To demonstrate these bots, we had to implement a rookit 
within the baseband firmware, which can modify the 
baseband’s RTOS and manage its state machine. There have 
been several cases where attackers have installed malware 
within a device’s firmware in order to perform malicious 
[32] [33]. In particular, baseband malware exploits and 
attacks are discussed and demonstrated [34] [35] [36] [37].  
5.2.1 OsmocomBB 
To make changes to a phone’s protocol stack, we used a 
GSM baseband software called OsmocomBB [38]. 
OsmocomBB is the only way to freely research the 
implementation of a mobile’s baseband software. 
OsmocomBB has been used for implementation in academic 
research and other publications.  The project currently 
supports several mobile phone models, of which we used the 
Motorola C123. Note that the implementation concepts in 
this section are relevant to UMTS and LTE as well [39]. 
5.2.2 Protocol Stack Modification 
 
The protocol stack in OsmocomBB consists of three main 
layers. From bottom to top they are: L1 - the radio interface, 
Figure 3. The architecture of the 911 DDoS bot within the 
firmware of the baseband processor. 
L2 - the data link layer, and L3 - the network layer. L3 - is 
divided into three sublayers, and from bottom up they are: L3a 
- radio resources management (RR), L3b - mobility 
management (MM), and L3c - connection management (CM). 
Based on the OsmocomBB 'mobile' application, we focus our 
implementation on the L3b and L3c sublayers where the 
network registration procedures are handled. By default, 
OsmocomBB has its device transmission (Tx) capabilities 
disabled. Therefore we had to compile the firmware with the 
DCONFIG_TX_ENABLE flag in order to enable outgoing 
calls.  
The main architecture of the bot is depicted in Fig 3. Our bot 
is implemented as a rootkit within the firmware of the 
baseband processor and is compound of two components (1) 
a bot caller, and (2) an anonymizer. The bot caller 
component manages the 911 call initiations (starting and 
stopping the DDoS attack). It handles the state machine, and 
enter and leave to/from anonymous mode. The call initiation 
is done by building emergency call requests via the CM and 
MM layers in the protocol stack. The anonymizer 
component resides between the MM and RR layers. It is 
aimed at hiding the device’s identity by masking or 
randomizing the device’s IMSI and IMEI identifiers before 
they reach the radio layer.  
 
5.2.3 Anonymized (ܣ bot) 
When a mobile phone is switched on, its baseband processor 
starts an IMSI attach procedure with the cellular network. 
During the IMSI attach, the device sends a "location update 
request" message which include its IMSI or TMSI. The 
Home Location Register (HLR) validates the IMSI by 
ensuring that it is known to the network and is allowed 
subscriber services. After the IMSI validation, the network 
sends an "authentication request" message back to the 
mobile phone, which answers with a calculated key (SRES, 
a 32-bit Signed Response). Once authenticated by the 
network, the mobile phone receives a "location updating 
accept" message which completes its registration process. 
To unregister from the network, the mobile phone sends an 
"IMSI detach" message which includes its IMSI.   
In no-SIM state, a mobile phone behaves like a device 
without a SIM card, and therefore lacks an IMSI. In GSM, 
UMTS and LTE standards, the device will not attempt to 
perform location updates to the network and rejects any 
request for MM connections except for making emergency 
calls [40]. Consequentially, in no-SIM state the device 
remains unidentified to the cellular network, yet can issue 
emergency calls.  
In order to put the device into no-SIM state, we patched the 
SIM initialization MM related procedures in L3. The 
anonymizer initiates a baseband report that the device SIM 
card is missing (in src/target/firmware/calypso). In order to 
disconnect the mobile phone from the network, the 
anonymizer invokes MMR_NREG_REQ [41] and initiates 
an IMSI detach procedure with the network. At the end of 
this process, the device is 1) in no-SIM state, 2) no longer 
registered to the network and, 3) able to initiate emergency 
calls as an NSI device. The emergency calls are issued from 
our bot caller component using CM SERVICE REQUEST 
with a service type information element set to emergency 
call establishment (0010). 
5.2.4 Persistent Anonymized (࡭∗ bot) 
Persistent anonymized bots provide the highest degree of 
anonymization in a cellular network. They continuously 
spoof the IMSI or IMEI in order to evade blacklisting and 
identification systems. We present two ways of 
implementing ܣ∗ bots: IMEI/IMSI Masking and IMSI/IMEI 
Spoofing.   
IMEI/IMSI Masking. The latest cellular standards require 
that a mobile phone must use its IMEI for identification in 
emergency calls (CM SERVICE REQUEST) when no IMSI 
is available during the IMSI attach procedure [24]. In no-
SIM state the IMSI is absent, hence basebands which are 
compliant with the standards must use the IMEI as an 
identifier to the network. ܣ∗ bots have a higher degree of 
anonymity, since their identifiers cannot be traced back to 
the device. They are also persistent in that they cannot be 
blacklisted, since they are don’t expose any fixed identifier 
to the network. The process is the same as we proposed for 
the ܣ type bot (no-SIM state) but with the addition of IMEI 
spoofing. For each initiation of an emergency call, we 
override the device’s current IMEI and replace it with a 
random, yet valid, IMEI value. As a result, different IMEI 
identifiers will be exposed to the network during sequential 
emergency calls.  
The outline of this variant is presented in Algorithm 1. 
Initially, the anonymizer invokes an IMSI detach procedure, 
and the device enters the no-SIM state (lines 3-4). The actual 
DDoS is accomplished within the bot caller, by repeatedly 
calling 911 and holding each call until a call-end event (lines 
6-10), each time with a random valid IMEI (line 7). After a 
specified number of calls, or when the user presses the 
keypad to initiate a call, the device returns to its normal 
functionality (lines 12-14).   
Algorithm 1    ܣ∗ Bot (No-SIM + IMEI Spoofing) 
1:  procedure Start-DDoS 
2:       // set the device state 
3:       Invoke(IMSI-Detach-procedure) 
4:       SetDeviceState(No-SIM) 
5:       // main DDoS loop. Stops when user activity 
detected 
6:       while (no key-pressed) do 
7:             SetIMEI(randomIMEI) 
8:             InitiateEmergencyCall() 
9:             yield(Call-End-event) 
10:     end while 
11:     // restore the device state and attach 
12:     SetIMEI(origionalIMEI) 
13:     SetDeviceState(Attached-SIM) 
14:   Invoke(IMSI-Attach-procedure) 
15:   Return 
 
Algorithm 2    ܣ∗ Bot (IMSI + IMEI Spoofing) 
1:  procedure Start-DDoS 
2:   // main DDoS loop. Stops when user activity detected 
3:       while (no key-pressed) do 
4:           // set random IMSI and attach 
5:           Invoke(IMSI-Detach-procedure) 
6             SetIMSI(randomIMSI) 
7:            Invoke(IMSI-Attach-procedure) 
8:            InitiateEmergencyCall() 
9:            // Call N times with the same identity 
10:          for (݅=1,…,ܰ) do 
1:                 InitiateEmergencyCall() 
12:               yield(Call-End-event) 
11           end for      
10:    end while 
11:    // restore the device identifiers and attach 
12     Invoke(IMSI-Detach-procedure) 
13:    SetIMSI(originalIMSI) 
14:   Invoke(IMSI-Attach-procedure) 
15:   Return 
 
IMEI/IMSI Spoofing. In this variant of ࡭∗, the mobile phone 
behaves like it has a SIM card, but it supplies the network with 
a spoofed IMSI. As a result, the device-network registration 
fails with a LOCATION UPDATING REJECT. However, the 
device is still permitted to make emergency calls as NSI device. 
This means that during the IMSI attach procedure the location 
update request is rejected by the network, since the IMSI is 
unknown. The network sends a LOCATION UPDATING 
REJECT message and the reject cause information element is 
set to the IMSI_UNKNOWN_TO_HLR or 
IMSI_UNKNOWN_TO_VLR values. In this state the device 
functionality is limited to emergency calls.  
We implement this variant by randomizing the IMSI of the 
device during the device’s location update procedure 
gsm48_mm_loc_upd_normal(). In this way the device 
registers with the network using a different IMSI after every 
few call, enabling it to attack under a new unknown identity. 
The outline of the IMSI spoofing operational mode is 
presented in Algorithm 2. 
Initially, the anonymizer performs the IMSI attach procedure 
with a randomized IMSI (line 1). The actual DDoS is 
accomplished by repeating emergency calls (lines 2-6) and 
subsequently invoking the IMSI detach procedure. At the 
end of the attack, an IMSI attach procedure with the real 
IMSI is invoked.   
The difference between the masking and spoofing variants 
of A* is that wireless carriers may be less able to block bots 
implementing IMSI spoofing. Recall that IMSI spoofing 
causes a NSI state of unknown IMSI. By blocking any 
unknown IMSI, legitimate roaming users would be blocked 
from 911 services, which is forbidden by the FCC 
regulations. On the other hand, the IMSI spoofing variant is 
slower than the IMSI masking variant, since it invokes the 
network IMSI attach and IMSI detach procedures frequently.  
Table 3 summarizes this information and presents a 
comparison between the different types of 911 bots and their 
characteristics. 
Table 3. Type of implemented bots. 
# Technique Bot type Implementation Comments 
1 No-SIM ࡭ Baseband rootkit 
Simple to 
implement 
2 No-SIM, IMEI Spoof ࡭
∗ Baseband rootkit 
Fastest 
operation 
3 IMSI & IMEI Spoof ࡭
∗ Baseband rootkit 
Highest 
anonymity 
4 IMSI, IMEI exposed ࡺ࡭ 
Android OS 
Malware OS-Level bot 
5.3 Test Environment 
In order to test and evaluate the implemented bots, we built 
a small cellular network in our lab (Fig. 4). This testbed 
allowed us to directly examine the traffic between a mobile 
phone and a cellular network. In particular, it enabled us to 
examine the transfer of device identifiers, network 
registration procedures, IMSI attach and IMSI detach 
procedures, and emergency call setups –all from the 
perspective of the cellular network. 
For the base transceiver station (BTS) we used the ip.access 
nanoBTS hardware [42] (Fig. 4a).  This is a small BTS with 
an Abis interface built in accordance with ETSI standards, 
thereby guaranteeing compatibility with existing handsets. 
We used the GPRS/GSM 900 model (165CU) which 
supports telephony services, speech codecs, and GPRS. The 
traffic to/from the nanoBTS was captured on an external 
desktop computer (Fig. 4b) via an Ethernet connection using 
the Wireshark and TShark tools. The nanoBTS was 
connected to a laptop (Fig. 4c) which simulated the 
network’s BSC, MSC, Home Location Register (HLR), and 
Visitor Location Register (VLR) using openBSC [43].  
With this testbed we successfully verified the ܰܣ, ܣ, and ܣ∗ 
bot concepts. The ܰܣ type bot was tested on the Samsung 
Galaxy S3, S4, and S5 smartphones running the Android 4.4 
(KitKat) and Android 5.x (Lollipop) OSs (Fig. 4d). In-call 
audio injection was verified on a Samsung Galaxy S4 Mini 
smartphone. The ܣ and ܣ∗ type bots required a modified 
protocol stack and were tested on a Motorola C123 mobile 
phone with a Calypso baseband (Fig. 4e). During the tests 
we checked the no-SIM and IMEI/IMSI spoofing 
operational states. We monitored the IMSI and IMEI 
identifiers within the relevant network registration, location 
Figure 4. The testing environment in the lab. 
 
updates, and call procedures.  
6. SIMULATION RESULTS & ANALYSIS 
In this section we verify whether anonymous unblockable 
911 bots (ܣ∗) are a significant threat. We accomplish this by 
(1) modeling the current E911 infrastructure based on 
surveys and gathered statistics, (2) examining the model to 
DDoS vulnerabilities in its structure, and (3) quantifying the 
impact of the attack by simulating attacks over the model. 
6.1 The E911 Network Model & Topology 
We model the E911 network as the bidirectional multigraph 
ܩ ≔ (ܸ, ܧ). Each vertex in ܸ has an associated type ܶ =
ሼPSAP,SR,CO,MSCሽ. An edge between two vertices in ܩ 
has a multiplicity equal to the number of trunks between 
them. A trunk can carry exactly one voice call at a time. ܩ 
has the following topological constraints: vertices of type 
CO, MSC, and PSAP can only be connected to vertices of 
type SR. Furthermore, vertices of type SR may be connected 
to other vertices of type SR (referred to as tandem 
connections). Lastly, vertices of type CO, MSC, and PSAP 
may be connected to more than one vertex of type SR and 
vice versa. As a visual reference, please refer to Fig. 1 in 
section 3. 
Let Γ௧(ݒ) be the set of vertices of type ݐ ∈ ܶ which have an 
edge shared with vertex ݒ. For example, ΓPSAP(ݏ௜) is the set 
of PSAPs connected to the SR ݏ௜. It is important to note that 
the network elements of ΓPSAP(ݏ௜) are all located in the same 
geographical region as ݏ௜. 
Given the assumed model above, we surveyed published 
reports online and produces three instances which reflect the 
US’s current infrastructure at city, state, and country levels: 
Country-level. In December 2015, there were 7,227 active 
PSAPs listed in the FCC master PSAP registry [44]. Explicit 
information on E911 networks is generally not available to 
the public. Therefore, we model the entire US E911 network 
based on general statistics and reports published from 2014 
to 2015 [45]. We use linear regression to complete the 
missing wireline/wireless call volume statistics for 27 states. 
In Fig. 5 we present each state’s call volume composition, 
where the red line indicates the average percent of wireless 
calls across the country (72.8%). 
Since information about all of the SRs in the US is 
unavailable, for each state in the country-level analysis we 
generalize the topology by assigning one SR to that state’s 
PSAPs. In order to determine each individual PSAP’s call 
volume, we divided the state’s call volume across its PSAPs 
scaled according to the PSAP’s local population [46]. In Fig.  
6 we plot the locations of every primary PSAP scaled 
according to their call volume. We assume that the PSAP’s 
number of consoles, trunks, and trunk types, reflect the 
configurations of NC’s PSAPs from [47]  as presented in 
Table 4. 
State-level. For a more detailed analysis, we model the state 
of North Carolina’s (NC) E911 infrastructure. In 2008, a 
survey detailing the state of NC’s E911 topology and 
network statistics was published [47]. In 2008, the state of 
North Carolina had a population of approximately 9.2 
million and was the tenth largest state in the US. NC had 20 
SRs managed by AT&T, Verizon, Embarq, Citizens 
Telephone, and Windstream, and 188 PSAPs with a total of 
775 call taker positions that handled an annual 911 call 
volume of 8,412,700 (23,048 calls daily).  
Using the data in [47] we were able to reconstruct most of 
NC’s E911 network topology. We refer to the reconstructed 
topology as ܩே஼ . Fig. 7 visualizes ܩே஼ , where red nodes are 
SRs, and the PSAPs are color coded according to their 
respective community. To determine each SR’s total 
inbound traffic volume, we aggregated the call traffic from 
the PSAPs to the SRs. More formally, given the SR ݏ, 
ݒ݋݈(ݏ) = ∑ ݒ݋݈(݌௜)
|୻PSAP(௦)|
௜  where ݌௜ ∈ ΓPSAP(ݏ) and 
ݒ݋݈(ݒ) is the average daily inbound call volume of vertex ݒ. 
In comparison with the FCC’s master PSAP registry [44]  we 
found that only one new PSAP (out of 188) has been added 
to NC between 2008 and 2016. Therefore we believe the 
information in [47] can be used to gain relevant insight into 
Figure 5. The percentage of each state’s wireline and wireless call volumes, sorted by highest annual call volume (left) to lowest (right). 
 
Figure 6. The locations and call volumes of the primary PSAPs on 
the US mainland, where the shades correspond to different states.
Configuration per PSAP Setting 
Number of consoles per 10K population 1.1925 
Number of Trunks per 10K population 1.7053 
Ratio of wireline / wireless / both trunks types 0.1602, 0.0951, 0.7448 
Percent of PSAPs that have no dedicated trunks 60% 
Table 4. Configurations applied to each PSAP (country-level). 
the current E911 infrastructure of US cities and states, and 
we select NC’s E911 network for our in depth analysis.  
City-Level. We select the city of Charlotte for our detailed 
analysis since it is the largest city in North Carolina with a 
population of nearly one million. The survey in [47] shows 
that the city had three PSAPs which handled a 911 call 
volume of 1,014,056 annually (2,778 calls daily). The survey 
also shows that the city’s PSAPs are served by three SRs 
serviced by AT&T. These SRs support an additional 25 
PSAPs outside of the city. The traffic of these external 
PSAPs directly affects the load on the SRs serving the city. 
We denote the subgraph containing the 25 PSAPs, the 3 
PSAPs serving Charlotte, and all contained edges as 
Charlotte’s PSAP community ܩ஼௛௔ , where ܩ஼௛௔௥ ⊂ ܩே஼.  
6.2  Topological Vulnerability Analysis 
Network Robustness.  NC’s 911 network has a heavy-tail 
degree distribution. These types of networks are robust to 
random failures (random vertex removals) but highly 
intolerant of targeted attacks (i.e., removal of the nodes with 
the largest degree). This means that should a central SR, such 
as Rocky Mount, get overloaded with DDoS calls, the 911 
system will be severely disabled. Consequently, should a 
DDoS attack disable the Rocky Mount SR, 64 PSAPs (~31% 
of the population) would be without access to 911 services. 
To make the system more robust, it is important that COs 
and MSCs be connected to redundant SRs. The NC’s PSAPs 
SR map is given in Appendix A. 
Selective Router Redundancy. Fig. 7 shows some regions 
have SRs which can act as redundancies encase of a traffic 
overflow. However, 83% of NC’s PSAPs are connected to a 
single SR. For example, Charlotte’s three PSAPs are only 
supported by the Charlotte Caldwell SR. The existing 
redundancies do not reflect the underlying population size. 
This puts more people at risk in the event of a DDoS attack 
due to single node failures.    
Traffic Overflows. We note that a DDoS attack launched 
from one geographic region can have an effect on 
neighboring regions. For example, if the city of Statesville 
undergoes a localized DDoS attack, the call volume will 
overwhelm the serving SRs (Caldwell and Lake Pointe). 
This will result in an outage of 20-22% of NC’s 911 services 
(measured by call volume). The overflow of legitimate calls 
in the Caldwell and Lake Pointe regions may be transferred 
to the University SR and overwhelm that SR as well. Note, 
SRs are sometimes programmed with overflow routes to 
default PSAPs regardless of the PSAP assigned to the caller 
in the SRDB [48]. Therefore, if the University SR is not 
overloaded, then some of its PSAPs may be overloaded with 
the extra traffic.   
PSAP Workload. NENA requires that PSAPs provide a 
grade of service (GoS) of 0.01 (i.e., no more than one out of 
every 100 calls are unanswered) [49]. From the data in [47] 
we calculated that 77% of the NC PSAPs believed that they 
needed a 22.3% and 41% increase of full and part-time call 
takers, respectively. Charlotte’s large PSAP (PSAP 2) 
reports that it needs an extra 33 full-time call takers, although 
it is only budgeted for three more. Therefore, the call taker 
workforce of NC is understaffed and may have difficulty 
meeting NENA’s requirement. This staffing problem is a 
well-known issue across the US and causes legitimate 911 
calls to get “the busy signal” on a regular basis [50]. This 
reality makes the threat of even a moderately sized DDoS 
attack much more significant. Moreover, we calculate that 
86% of all call taker positions in NC hold the dispatcher 
responsibility as well (i.e., the one who contacts the fire, 
police, or medical services). This affects the rate at which 
calls can be processed. 
PSAP Call Balancing. When a voice circuit is established 
between two endpoints in telephony networks, the respective 
trunks between each of the involved switches are occupied 
by the call. Therefore, when a SR connects a call to a PSAP, 
the trunk used between the SR and the PSAP is busy until 
the call is ended by the caller or the PSAP. Charlotte does 
not have any trunks dedicated for wireline calls. This means 
that the traffic from a mobile DDoS attack can block out all 
legitimate 911 callers, even if the trunks are occupied for 
only a few seconds at a time.   
PSAP Call Waiting. If there are more trunks than call taker 
positions, callers can be put on hold until they can be 
answered. More formally, let ݐݎ(݌) and ܿ(݌) be the number 
of PSAP ݌’s inbound trunks and call taker (console) 
positions. We calculate the queue length of ݌ as, 
ܳ(ܲ) = ൜ݐݎ(ܲ) − ܿ(ܲ), ݐݎ(ܲ) ≥  ܿ(ܲ) 0, ݈݁ݏ݁                   (1) 
Figure 7. The E911 network topology of North Carolina. 
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Figure 8. A flow chart describing the operation of the DES. 
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Using (1) on the data in [50] we found that only 67% of NC’s 
PSAPs have queues where the average queue length is 1.4. 
Charlotte’s PSAPs have no queues at all. A PSAP with no 
queue blocks incoming calls while all its call takers are busy. 
These delays have immediate repercussions to the caller’s 
personal safety, because in some emergencies, every second 
counts.  
6.3 Attack Simulation & Impact 
6.3.1 The Discreet Event Simulator 
In order to measure the impact of a mobile phone DDoS 
attack on the selected E911 networks, we use a discreet event 
simulator (DES). The simulation input parameters are the 
simulation duration (ݐ௦௜௠஽௨௥), DDoS start time (ݐௗௗ௢௦ௌ௧௔௥௧), 
and number of bots (݊௕௢௧). The flow chart in Fig. 8 
summarizes how the DES works. The following are the base 
assumptions taken for the simulation. 
Time of day. Since PSAPs are generally fully staffed during 
the busy hour of the day, we simulate the DDoS at this time 
(the best-case scenario). We assume that the busy hour of a 
PSAP contains 15% of the daily call volume (denoted as 
ߙ௕௛) as used in the official NENA staffing guide [51]. 
Call Event Generation. In our DES, calls enter the 
simulation at the intake of the network’s SRs. Let ߣ௦ =
௩௢௟(௦)∙ఈ್೓
଺଴∗଺଴
 be the average call arrival rate of legitimate calls 
during the busy hour for the SR ݏ measured in calls per 
second. For each ݏ௜ ∈ ܵ we randomly generate that SR’s 
legitimate calls over a Poisson distribution using ߣ௦೔. 
According to the report in [25], 70% of all 911 calls are 
wireless. We assume that the call types are distributed 
uniformly across the population, so that for a randomly 
selected caller ݌(wireless) = 0.7 and ݌(wireline) = 1 −
݌(wireless). The bots are distributed at the SRs in 
proportional to the SRs’ legitimate call volume. 
Call Processing Time. We model the legitimate call service 
time of PSAP ݌ with an exponential distribution, where ߣ௣ 
is provided in [47] for the state-level, and for the country-
level we take 60 and 90 seconds for wireline and wireless 
calls, respectively [51]. We assume that the call service time 
for a bot is approximately six seconds: the time it takes for a 
call taker to say “9-1-1, what is your emergency?” and listen 
for a few seconds to be sure that the call is indeed a bot.  
Redials. Let ݌(recall) be the probability of a legitimate 
caller redialing 9-1-1 after being blocked. In a real 
emergency, a legitimate caller will persist in calling 911 until 
his/her call is answered. Therefore, we set ݌(recall) to 0.85 
as used in [52]. We assume that the redial delay has an 
exponential distribution with an average of ߚ = 20 seconds 
(with a four second overhead for the end-to-end call setup 
time [53]).  
SR Capacity. Since a SR is a telephony switch, it can be expected 
that the SR ݏ has a capacity similar in magnitude to 
∑ ݐݎ൫ΓPSAP(ݏ)൯. However, in the simulation we do not limit the 
SR’s capacity but rather focus on the PSAP’s capacity instead. 
Later we will analyze the SR load. 
6.3.2 Simulation Results 
Caller Experience. At the state-level, we found that as little 
as 6,000 bots (0.0006% of NC’s population) is enough to 
deny 20% and 50% of wireline and wireless callers from 
ever reaching 911 services (after 4-5 attempts each per 
caller). This is even more significant considering that 70% 
of 911 calls are wireless. With 50K bots (0.0054% of NC’s 
population) nearly 90% of all wireless 911 callers never 
reach a call taker. Fig. 9 presents the percent of callers who 
give up on 911 services for different numbers of bots 
attacking NC.  
Since bots make wireless calls, they do not impact the wireline 
caller’s give up rate after 25k bots. This is because some 
PSAPs have dedicated wireline trunks. However, the city of 
Charlotte’s PSAPs have no dedicated trunks. As a result, 6K 
bots in NC (2.8K falling in the jurisdiction of Charlotte’s 
PSAP community) is enough to deny ~80% of Charlotte’s 911 
callers from emergency services.  
For those in NC who successfully reach a call taker, there is 
a significant amount of time wasted in redial attempts. Fig. 
10 shows (a) the average service time (time elapsed between 
the first call and dispatch) and (b) the average number of 
calls made until answered for different sizes of DDoS 
 
Figure 9. The percent of NC’s 911 callers who give up on 
reaching 911 services under different sized DDoS attacks. 
 
Figure 10. The effect of the number of bots on NC’s 911 call 
response time. 
  Percent of Callers who  Give up on Reaching 911 
Avrg. Number of Calls Made 
until Answered 
  Wireline Wireless All Wireline Wireless All 
Nu
m
be
r o
f 
Bo
ts 
0 0.13% 0.11% 0.11% 1 1 1 
100,000 8.87% 15.30% 13.56% 1.32 1.56 1.49 
200,000 23.06% 37.16% 33.36% 1.85 2.59 2.36 
320,000 34.04% 51.88% 47.08% 2.02 3.24 2.83 
500,000 40.27% 63.61% 57.32% 2.11 3.91 3.23 
800,000 48.59% 74.46% 67.49% 1.96 4.3 3.3 
Table 5. The effect various sized attacks on the entire US have 
on legitimate 911 callers. 
attacks. Fig. 10 shows that with 6K bots, increases the 
service time by 40%. In this scenario, a caller would wait an 
additional 45sec-3min (factoring one standard deviation) 
and call an average of three times to get emergency service. 
At the country-level, we found that as little as 200,000 bots, 
distributed across the population of the US, is enough to 
significantly disrupt 911 services across the US (Table 5). 
This means that an attacker only needs to infect ~0.0006% 
of the country’s population in order to successfully DDoS 
emergency services (In 2014, the USA has a population of 
~319 million [46]). Under these circumstances, an attacker 
can cause 33% of the nations’ legitimate callers to give up in 
reaching 911.  
PSAP Performance. Some regions of NC receive a lower 
GoS than others because not every PSAP is configured the 
same. For instance, NC has 28 PSAPs that have 2 call taker 
positions, and daily call volumes ranging from 1 to 58 calls. 
In light of this reality, it is clear that a caller’s accessibility 
to 911 during a DDoS attack is dependent on his/her location 
(i.e. serving PSAP). On average, during a 6K bot attack, the 
percent of NC residents which are denied service (given a 
busy-tone) is 75% and 91% when calling from wireline and 
wireless devices respectively.  
The bottom of Fig. 11 shows the average for each state of the 
US. Note that a state’s average PSAP GoS does not reflect the 
number of callers who give up in that state. This is because the 
GoS also takes into account calls which were rejected by a 
PSAP, but handed over to another one. Fig. 11 shows that all 
states exceed NENA’s requirement of a GoS of p0.01 [49] 
when under a relatively small attack. 
Network Performance. An overload in the network itself 
prevents 911 calls from reaching PSAPs. Legitimate callers 
increase the call volume during an attack because they redial 
if blocked. We found that a 6K botnet attack can cause a 
160% increase in NC’s legitimate call volume.  
Calls which are not connected to a PSAP (bot and legitimate) 
add to the SR’s load as well. This is because the TS-SR trunk 
is occupied for at least the time it takes to setup the trunk 
between the switches. This call setup time is 3.9 seconds 
when using multi-frequency (MF) signaling and 100ms 
when using the SS7 network [54]. Although MF is an old 
signaling method, it is still may be employed in some areas. 
We will assume that ∑ ݐݎ(Γெௌ஼,஼ை(ݏ)) = ∑ ݐݎ൫Γ௉ௌ஺௉(ݏ)൯. 
The offered load of a single trunk (one voice line), when 
measured in Erlangs, is the number of traffic hours offered 
to the trunk per hour. Therefore, a SR is overloaded if it has 
an offered load greater than an average of one Erlang per 
trunk.  
With SS7 signaling, the DES showed that NC will have 37% 
of its SRs overloaded during a 6K sized attack affecting 45% 
of NC’s 911 callers. Moreover, for old networks employing 
MF signaling, 87% of SRs would be overloaded affecting 
98% of 911 callers. For this reason SRs which still employ 
MF signaling should be immediately considered for a SS7 
signaling upgrade. 
In summary, the results from this section show that only a few 
anonymous 911 bots (ܣ) are enough to successfully disrupt 911 
services, if not mitigated. However, considering that ܣ∗ type bots 
cannot be mitigated with conventional countermeasures (e.g., 
blacklisting), ܣ∗ bots pose a far more significant threat that should 
be addressed. 
7. COUNTERMEASURES 
In this section we briefly survey the known countermeasures 
which affect ܰܣ and ܣ type bots. In particular, we propose 
countermeasures that are specific to mitigating the threat of ܣ∗ 
type bots. In Table 6 we summarize the findings. In general, 
   Deployed in Relevancy 
  
Ch
an
ge
 in
 cu
rre
nt
 
FC
C 
Re
gu
la
tio
ns
 
M
ob
ile
 D
ev
ic
e 
C
el
lu
la
r N
et
w
or
k 
E9
11
 N
et
w
or
k 
PS
A
P 
ܰ
ܣ ܣ ܣ∗
 
Pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e 
Disallow NSI calls  X  X    X X 
Trusted Device Identification  X X     X 
Human Presence Detection  X X X   X X X 
M
iti
ga
tiv
e 
Blacklist DDoS Callers  X  X X  X X  
Call Firewall   X    X X X 
Priority Queuing    X X  X X 
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Locate & Collect DDoS Devices     X X X X 
Table 6. Summary of countermeasures, where those in bold are 
based on existing methods. 
 
Figure 11. The impact of 200K bots across the US has on each state’s (top) number of caller despairs and (bottom) average PSAP GoS. 
countermeasures which are deployed earlier in the call 
connection process (i.e., the left of Fig. 1 in section 3) are 
preferable since they minimize the load on PSAPs and 
consume fewer resources in the network.  
Attack Prevention. In order to prevent an attack from 
anonymous type bots, we propose two methods: Disallow NSI 
calls and Trusted Device Identification. In Disallow NSI calls, 
911 calls from NSI devices are disallowed and no longer 
forwarded by wireless carriers. This method requires a change 
in current FCC regulations [57], and poses an ethical problem 
since there are those who rely of NSI devices [55]. In Trusted 
Device Identification, the device is forced to send a trusted 
unaltered identifier to the network. The identifier such as 
IMEI, must be stored in a trusted memory region (e.g., ARM 
TrustZone [56]) so it cannot be changed by malware at any 
level. Trusted device identification is used in mobile-payment 
solutions. 
An existing preventative measure that effects anonymous 
type bots is Human Presence Detection. This method has 
been discussed in [57] [62]. The general approach is to have 
the network or PSAP  automatically detect human activity 
associated with the 911 call. For example, the pressing 
numbers, DTMF pressing patterns [58], or some other 
captcha [59]. This method may still lead to an overload in the 
network if there are too many bots. 
Attack Mitigation. If the preventative measures cannot be 
taken, then mitigative measures can be deployed to minimize 
the impact of the attack. One approach is to implement on 
each device a mandatory Call Firewall. In this approach 
trusted low-level software components are used to identify 
and block DDoS activities (e.g. frequent 911 calls), similar 
to what has been proposed in [60] for PCs. Another option is 
that each PSAP implement Priority Queues where callers 
with more reliable identifiers (e.g., valid IMSI versus some 
IMEI) receive higher priorities when being connected to a 
call-taker. This approach is only effective if the queue length 
is sufficiently long, however PSAPs typically only have a 
few extra trunks, if any at all.  
To evaluate Call Firewall and Priority Queues against an ܣ∗ 
we implemented both countermeasures in the DES. We 
found that Call Firewall was the most effective since it 
minimizes the load on the network and the consumption of 
PSAP trunks. However, this solution must be implemented in a 
trusted layer of the mobile phone. 
There are several known and deployed countermeasures. For 
example, one approach is to block callers who abuse 911 
(e.g. prank callers) by implementing and enforcing a 
Blacklist DDoS of Callers [62]. In this approach callers are 
blocked at either the network or PSAP by marking their 
identifiers in a shared database similar [61]. Enforcment at 
the entry to the network minimizes the risk of an overload. 
This method poses an ethical issue since will prevent the 
device’s legitimate owner from making a 911 call [62]. 
Moreover, it is ineffective against ܣ∗ type bots since they 
randomize their identifiers. Another approach is Silence 
Detection where 911 calls with no audio are blocked in the 
network or at the PSAPs. This approach is weak to bots that can 
inject recorded/synthesized audio into the call. Moreover, it 
poses an ethical issue since it incurs delays and is not 
friendly to the deaf community’s needs [62]. 
As a last resort, law enforcement can Locate & Collect the DDoS 
Devices. This approach is not effective because locating a 
device is a joint effort between the police and the PSAP staff 
that can take anywhere between 30 minutes and 30 hours 
[63] requiring a lot of the police and PSAP staff’s time. We 
estimate that it would take NC more than a week to capture 
the majority of an attack based on 6,000 bots. To mitigate 
the load of the bot traffic on the network, operators can 
selectively Disable Cell/Sector Service. Of course, this 
approach is undesirable, but it may benefit the greater good 
until the infected devices have been located or effectively 
blocked [62].  
8. CONCLUSION 
The threat of a DDoS attack on 911 services launched from 
a mobile phone botnet has not been investigated in the past. 
In this paper we expose a types of DDoS attack on 911 that 
cannot be blocked though conventional means. We show 
that a bot placed within the baseband firmware of a mobile 
phone can alter the internal protocol stack and render the 
device to have no genuine identification within the 2G, 3G, 
and 4G cellular networks. Such a bot can issue repeated 
emergency calls that cannot be blocked, technically or 
legally, by the network or the emergency call centers. We 
demonstrated the feasibility of this type of attack by 
successfully implementing and testing the bots within a 
small cellular network. By simulating attacks on current 911 
infrastructure, we found that just 6K bots are sufficient to 
significantly compromise the availability of a state’s 911 
services (and the deployment of only 200K bots can 
jeopardize services across the entire US). Lastly, we 
enumerated device-level and network-level 
countermeasures and examined their effectiveness. We 
believe that the contributions of this paper will assist the 
respective organizations, lawmakers, and security 
professionals in understanding the scope of this issue and aid 
in the prevention of possible future attacks on the 911 
emergency services. 
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APPENDIX A. NC’s PSAPs SR map 
 
 
NC’s PSAPs on a map that shows which PSAPs are 
connected to which SR by circling them accordingly. If a 
PSAP is in an overlapping region, then it is an indication 
that the PSAP has shared responsibilities between the 
two geographical areas. 
